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Abstract 
 
This study attempts to evaluate the efficacy of macroeconomic policies in resolving financial 
market disequilibria and to elucidate the influence of the political landscape and global 
financial integration on the policymaking process. The current investigation examines three 
macroeconomic policies (i) government spending, (ii) liquidity provision and (iii) central 
bank interest rates by analysing 21 countries around the globe. The results suggest that 
government spending is a suboptimal macroeconomic policy for mitigating imbalances in 
financial markets, as it may have destabilizing effects. Liquidity provision was found to be 
ineffective in facilitating financial market stability whereas the adjustment of interest rates 
was found to be a viable tool for mitigating financial market imbalances. Therefore, an 
appropriate policy framework would comprise the following: prudent government spending, 
conditional liquidity provision and a reduction in interest rates following the development of 
financial market disequilibria. Furthermore, this study found strong evidence against the 
notion that political orientations influence policy frameworks which were designed to redress 
financial market disequilibria. This study also found that global financial integration does not 
influence the policymaking process.  
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1. Introduction  
Following the 2008 Financial Crisis, policy frameworks designed to mitigate financial market 
disequilibria and economic downturns have been re-evaluated in an attempt to identify the 
role of macroeconomic policies in supplementing macroprudential regulation (Blanchard, et 
al., 2012). A paradigm shift regarding conventional policy frameworks which focus on core 
economic objectives has occurred, with many countries such as the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Japan providing unorthodox support to financial systems through 
macroeconomic policies (Feenstra and Taylor, 2014). Given the dynamic and unpredictable 
nature of financial systems, the task of designing and implementing macroeconomic policies 
to resolve financial market disequilibria and stimulate economies is particularly challenging. 
Macroeconomic policies may also be subject to the influence of the political landscape and 
global financial integration, which may determine the choice and efficacy of these policies 
(Soare, 2013).  
 
The function of macroeconomic policies in resolving financial market disequilibria has 
undergone a certain degree of clarification in recent years (Blanchard, et al., 2012). 
Regarding fiscal policies, the use of government spending as a stabilisation tool in financial 
markets is typically given more credence than tax policies (Delong, et al., 2012). Bachmann 
and Sims (2012) postulated that increasing government expenditure fosters confidence within 
financial markets, which may alleviate any bottlenecks in the flow of funds and help redress 
financial market imbalances. However, Afonso and Sousa (2011) argued that government-
spending shocks increase interest rates and displace consumption and investment.1 As for 
monetary policies, many studies such as Mishkin (2011) and Gali (2013) posited that a viable 
                                                     
1 This is known as the ‘crowding out’ effect as government-spending shocks utilise resources that are often 
limited during periods of financial market disequilibria or recessions (Auerback and Gorodnichenko, 2013).  
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policy framework to resolve financial market disequilibria includes providing liquidity2 and 
adjusting interest rates or repo rates.  Providing liquidity and reducing interest rates may 
alleviate the funding shortages of financial intermediaries, which increases lending activities 
and helps mitigate financial market disequilibria (Woodford, 2012). Other studies however 
argue the low interest rate policy and excess liquidity lead financial intermediaries to take 
excessive risks (Taylor, 2009). More specifically, Taylor (2009) criticises the monetary 
policies by central banks such as the US Federal Reserves that held interest rates too low for 
too long in the run up to the 2008 Financial Crisis. Hence, prior literature suggest that the 
primary macroeconomic policies used to resolve imbalances in financial markets may be 
government expenditure, liquidity provision and the adjustment of interest rates.   
 
Macroeconomic policies are subject to the influence of the political landscape, which may 
affect their efficacy in mitigating financial market disequilibria (Soare, 2013). The core 
objectives of macroeconomic policies are often determined by the political ideologies of 
governments and their electoral accountability (Fredriksson, et al., 2013). Rausser, et al 
(2011) Bjornskov and Potrafke (2011) postulated that political ideologies determine the 
urgency attributed to financial market and economic issues, as objective economic interests 
and subjective preferences vary across political orientations. Fundamental to the left-wing or 
liberal perspective is the significant role of governments in achieving distributive justice3 
(Hayek, 2012). Essentially, left-wing governments have a tendency to prioritise the reduction 
of unemployment, implementing macroeconomic policies primarily to restore economic 
stability, facilitate an equal distribution of income and property and prevent market abuse 
                                                     
2 Central banks provide liquidity to financial intermediaries through open market operations. A paragon of 
liquidity provision is the Term Action Facility (TAF) implemented by the United States Federal Reserve which 
allows financial intermediaries in the United States to bid for sound short-term loans that have relatively low 
interest rates (Mishkin, 2011).  
3 Distributive justice refers to the fair distribution of goods and services throughout a society (Greenberg and 
Cohen, 2014).  
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(Hutchison, 2013). Conversely, proponents of the right-wing or conservative perspective 
oppose intrusive government intervention (Bjornskov and Potrafke, 2011). Right-wing 
governments have an inclination to pursue price stability, with unemployment being 
secondary in their macroeconomic objectives (Thompson, 2014). Hence, right-wing 
governments try to facilitate market solutions before intervening. Suffice to say, extremism in 
political ideologies is rare, as there tends to be some convergence across the political 
spectrum (Hutchison, 2013). Nevertheless, the political landscape generates profound 
interference throughout the policymaking process, determining the timing and choice of 
macroeconomic policies implemented to mitigate financial market imbalances (Soare, 2013). 
As such, the political landscape may influence the efficacy of macroeconomic stabilisation 
policies. 
 
Beyond the political landscape, the choice of macroeconomic policies is also influenced by 
global financial integration4 (Koenig and Zeyneloglu, 2010; Corbett and Xu, 2015). 
Notwithstanding the fact that global financial integration encourages the flow of funds, it also 
increases contagion or the exposure of financial systems to systemic risks (Corbett and Xu, 
2015). Many studies such as Feenstra and Taylor (2014) and Karras (2014) argued that global 
financial integration increases policy spillovers5 between countries, and governments tend to 
respond to these externalities by implementing various macroeconomic policies. Moreover, 
the efficacy of macroeconomic policies may also be partially contingent on the degree of 
global financial integration (Mishkin, 2009). By increasing arbitrage opportunities, global 
financial integration may inhibit the real effects of expansionary fiscal policies (Mishkin, 
2009). As for monetary policies, global financial integration reduces the ability of central 
                                                     
4 Global financial integration refers to the interconnectedness of financial systems around the world (Corbett and 
Xu, 2015). 
5 Policy spillovers are instances where macroeconomic policies implemented in a particular country influence 
developments in another country (Karras, 2014).  
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banks to control market interest rates, intensifying the role of exchange rates as policy 
transmission mechanisms (Gadanecz and Mehrotra, 2014). There has also been a growing 
consensus throughout the existing literature that global financial integration induces the 
coordination of macroeconomic policies across countries, led by a cohort of countries such as 
the Group of Seven (G7)6 (Feenstra and Taylor, 2014). By impeding the efficacy of 
macroeconomic policies and potentially reducing the level of autonomy governments have in 
the policymaking process, global financial integration can influence the choice of 
macroeconomic policies that governments administer (Feenstra and Taylor, 2014). Thus, 
global financial integration may have significant implications on the effectiveness of 
macroeconomic policies implemented to resolve financial market disequilibria.  
 
The purpose of this study is to elucidate an effective macroeconomic policy framework for 
resolving financial market disequilibria, accounting for the influence of the political 
landscape and global financial integration on the choice of macroeconomic policies. As such, 
this study aims to (i) determine the efficacy of macroeconomic policies (government 
spending, liquidity provision and central bank interest rates) in resolving imbalances in 
financial markets; (ii)  ascertain whether or not political orientations influence the 
policymaking process in terms of the choice of macroeconomic policies implemented to 
resolve financial market disequilibria7; and (iii) elucidate the influence of global financial 
integration on the choice of macroeconomic policies aimed to resolve financial market 
disequilibria. 
 
                                                     
6 The G7 or Group of Seven is a bloc consisting of strong industrial countries, namely Canada, the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, Italy and Japan (Taylor, 2013).   
7 Regarding the influence of political orientations, this study only considers the three main political orientations 
rather than the entire political spectrum. 
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2. Literature Review 
Literature on macroeconomic policies has begun to transcend the notion that macroeconomic 
policies should primarily be implemented to minimise the amplitude of the general economic 
cycle. Various studies have highlighted the significance of macroeconomic policies relative 
to resolving financial market disequilibria. Recent studies revolve around the debate on 
whether or not macroeconomic policies should be implemented to redress financial market 
imbalances. 
 
Three cardinal perspectives originate from the emergence of the significance of 
macroeconomic policies, which are that macroeconomic policies should be either proactive, 
or reactive or neutral in nature. A fundamental feature of theories that advocate proactive 
macroeconomic policies is the notion that financial market disequilibria can be identified. 
Studies such Yurichuk (2010) and Schwaab et al. (2013) argue that preventative measures 
should be implemented since financial market disequilibria can be identified. Proponents of 
proactive macroeconomic stabilisation policies also argue that there is an inherent lag in 
macroeconomic stabilisation policies, which necessitates more pre-emptive measures 
(Kobayashi, 2013; Stoian, 2014). Studies have also investigated the financial market 
conditions necessary for macroeconomic policies to be implemented (Bask, 2012; Gwilym, 
2013).  
 
Furthermore, studies rooted in this perspective argue that alternative measures such as 
macroprudential regulation, though less invasive than macroeconomic policies, are 
ineffective in resolving financial market disequilibria (Evanoff, et al., 2012). Based on the 
premise that volatility in one market can induce panic in another market, Liang et al. (2012) 
analysed the interaction between different financial market imbalances. Liang et al. (2012) 
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concluded that macroprudential regulation does not adequately restore market fundamentals 
or impede information-induced panic, which may perpetuate financial market imbalances.  
 
Contrary to proactive macroeconomic policy advocates, proponents of reactive 
macroeconomic policies argue that financial market disequilibria cannot be easily identified. 
Posen (2011) argued that conventional indicators of financial market imbalances such as 
credit growth are not robust and may not capture financial market disequilibria. Moreover, 
König and Pothier (2015) added that contemporary models do not provide easily measurable 
and unequivocal indicators that policymakers can use. Hence, with the inherent difficulty in 
identifying financial market dislocations, policy frameworks may not be effective. Many 
studies have also argued that reactive macroeconomic stabilisation policies effectively 
resolve financial market disequilibria with little externalities (Junevicius and Justinaviciene, 
2010).  
 
Gali (2013) suggested that proactive monetary policies such as raising interest rates during 
the formation of financial market disequilibria are counterproductive because financial 
market volatility may increase as a result.8 Yao et al. (2014) augmented the propositions of 
Gali (2013) and concluded that the effectiveness of monetary policies in resolving financial 
market disequilibria in the short-run depends on investor behaviour.9 These studies suggest 
that proactive macroeconomic stabilisation policies may be too impulsive and reactive 
macroeconomic stabilisation policies may be less invasive and more effective.  
 
                                                     
8 Studies such as Taylor (2009), however, argue that low interest rates may have set the stage for the 2008 
Financial Crisis. 
9 For instance, irrational investors may trade against macroeconomic policies (Yao, et al., 2014; Hanson and 
Stein, 2015). Other key studies such as Driffill (2013) and Huang and Yeh (2015) argued that systematic fiscal 
policies are more effective than monetary policies such as quantitative easing which may hinder financial 
market stability by increasing the risk exposure of central banks. 
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Prior to the 2008 Financial Crisis, many studies such as Bernanke et al. (1999) postulated that 
macroeconomic stabilisation policies aimed at resolving financial market imbalances were 
unnecessary.10 Years later, Kuttner (2012) postulated that macroprudential regulation is 
pivotal in resolving financial market imbalances and facilitating financial market stability. 
Acharya and Naqvi (2012) augmented this proposition and concluded that macroprudential 
regulation should aim to reduce excess liquidity since excessive leveraging is the primary 
driver of financial market imbalances. However, both Kuttner (2012) and Acharya and Naqvi 
(2012) disregarded the fact that reducing liquidity may lead to liquidity hoarding in the 
financial system, which causes inefficiency in financial markets. Studies have also given 
credence to the notion that limited financial knowledge and lack of experience are 
instrumental factors in the formation of financial market imbalances (Emmons and Noeth, 
2013; Cason and Samek, 2014). 
 
Thus, these three perspectives on macroeconomic stabilisation policies have been the locus of 
recent literature, most notably in the aftermath of the 2008 Financial Crisis. Each perspective 
advocates different policy responses to financial market disequilibria. Suffice to say, 
policymakers can use an amalgam of these perspectives as each has its own merit. 
Nevertheless, these perspectives articulate the significance of implementing a mixture of 
macroeconomic stabilisation policies and macroprudential regulation to effectively redress 
financial market disequilibria.  Based on this analysis, we set out our first four hypotheses (in 
their alternative form) as follows:  
H1: Government spending does not significantly mitigate imbalances in financial markets. 
H2: Government spending effectively stimulates GDP, consumption and investment and 
reduces market interest rates. 
                                                     
10 This was primarily due to the fact that a common facet of the mandate of monetary authorities is to ensure 
price stability, which was thought to facilitate financial stability (Bernanke et al., 1999). 
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H3: Liquidity provision does not significantly resolve financial market disequilibria. 
H4: Lowering central bank interest rates promotes stability in financial markets during 
periods of disequilibrium. 
 
2.1 The Influence of the Political Landscape 
A predominant strand of literature on the political economy is the determinants of the 
political landscape. Studies such as Rausser et al (2011) have postulated that the inherent 
economic interests and subjective preferences of different political orientations have a direct 
bearing on whether governments are proactive, neutral, or reactive in trying to mitigate 
financial market imbalances. As such, political orientations may influence the policy 
frameworks of governments during financial market disequilibria.  
 
Many studies have analysed the influence of political orientations on the implementation of 
macroeconomic policies (Song, 2010; Crawford, 2012 and Samuels and Shugart, 2011). Song 
(2010) suggests that left-wing governments are proactive in resolving financial market 
disequilibria while right-wing governments are more reactive. Centrist governments evaluate 
the trade-off between ignoring financial market and responding to financial market 
imbalances. However, the preferences of various political orientations are not necessarily 
absolute, as Samuels and Shugart (2011) argued that financial market instability or economic 
recessions might cause policy convergence. 
 
Another field of inquiry is the evaluation of the effects of market failures on the political 
landscape (Perez and Westrup, 2008). For example, Hayford and Malliaris (2008) posited 
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that the political landscape sets constraints for macroeconomic stabilisation policies.11 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) offer contrasting insights in their analysis of economic 
policy advice, arguing that the policymaking process often excludes politics because of the 
exclusive focus of policymakers on resolving financial market disequilibria. Nevertheless, 
these studies accentuated the relationship amongst financial market disequilibria, the political 
landscape, and macroeconomic stabilisation policies.  
 
Thus, literature on the influence of the political landscape on macroeconomic policies 
surpasses the rudimentary contention that the political landscape is significant. Key fields of 
inquiry include the determinants of the political landscape, the influence of political 
orientations on the implementation of macroeconomic policies and the effects of market 
failure on the political landscape. The political landscape is a pivotal factor in designing 
policy frameworks to mitigate financial market disequilibria. Hence, we develop our next 
three hypothesis:  
H5: Left-wing governments are more proactive than right-wing governments in redressing 
financial market disequilibria.  
H6: Centrist governments have an inclination to implement macroeconomic policies in order 
to resolve imbalances in financial markets.   
H7: Financial market disequilibria cause policy convergence across political ideologies. 
 
2.2 The Influence of Global Financial Integration 
There is a growing consensus in recent literature that global financial integration significantly 
influences the macroeconomic policy framework chosen to mitigate imbalances in financial 
                                                     
11 Perez and Westrup (2008) argued that elected governments have an inclination to implement macroeconomic 
stabilisation policies and macroprudential regulation that limit their exposure or political costs rather than policy 
frameworks that are more optimal. Based on this premise, Hayford and Malliaris (2008) suggested that it is 
unlikely that monetary authorities will be able to increase interest rates only to prevent financial market 
dislocations. 
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markets (Thurston and Bowen, 2011). Prasad et al. (2003) alluded to the fact that global 
financial integration has a significant impact on macroeconomic policies. Other studies 
(Kose, et al., 2006; Vo and Daly, 2007) have contended that the effects of financial global 
integration on the macroeconomic policy framework of countries depends on the level of 
domestic financial market development, the quality of corporate governance, macroeconomic 
policy regimes and the degree of trade liberalisation. The central idea of these studies is that 
global financial integration influences the implementation of macroeconomic policies. For 
example, Correa and Girón (2013) argued that the degree of global financial integration 
determines the effect of foreign macroeconomic policies on capital flows, and domestic 
dependence on these capital flows influences the severity of macroeconomic policies. In 
addition, Pierre (2015) argued that global financial integration is a primary driver of market 
deregulation, redefining the ultimate objectives and tools of macroeconomic policies.  
 
Another strand of literature focuses on the measures to control global financial integration. At 
the locus of this strand of literature is the notion that globalisation, in general, restricts the 
autonomy of countries relative to their macroeconomic policy framework and increases 
vulnerability to global financial risks (Rodrik, 2012; Fratzscher, 2012; Goldberg, 2013). For 
example, Ahmed and van Hulten (2014) and Obstfeld (2015) posited that macroeconomic 
policies such as flexible exchange rates could be used to control global financial integration. 
These studies contributed to the literature by elucidating various measures to reduce the 
effects of global financial integration and provide insulation from potential financial and 
monetary shocks.  
 
In summary, global financial integration, like the political landscape, is instrumental in the 
implementation of macroeconomic stabilisation policies. As such, policymakers should 
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consider the degree of global financial integration when formulating macroeconomic policies 
aimed at resolving financial market disequilibria. On this basis, we develop our final four 
hypothesis:  
H8: Global financial integration does not significantly influence government spending during 
periods of financial market disequilibria. 
H9: Global financial integration leads governments to implement liquidity provision as a 
financial market stabilisation tool. 
H10: The adjustment of central bank interest rates is significantly influenced by global 
financial integration.   
H11: Global financial integration causes policy harmonisation across countries during periods 
of financial market disequilibria.  
 
It is clear that recent literature has not sufficiently explicated the strategic use of 
macroeconomic policies to remedy financial market disequilibria (Blanchard, et al., 2012). 
Until recently, fiscal policies were regarded as secondary within the macroeconomic policy 
framework to stabilise imbalances within the financial market, primarily due to the time 
needed to formulate appropriate policies and the lags involved with their implementation 
(Feenstra and Taylor, 2014). Further analyses could expound on whether or not government 
expenditure dovetails with monetary policies as a stabilisation policy (Bachmann and Sims, 
2012). Relative to monetary policies, there is insufficient research regarding the efficacy of 
liquidity provision and adjustments of central bank interest rates in resolving financial market 
disequilibria, specifically across a wide variety of countries which have different monetary 
policy capacities (Woodford, 2012).  
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Furthermore, examinations of the political landscape have not adequately delineated its 
influence on the policymaking process during periods of financial market disequilibria 
(Bjornskov and Potrafke, 2011).  There is ambiguity regarding the policy tools which left-
wing, centrist and right-wing governments are inclined to implement in order to resolve 
imbalances in financial markets (Woodford, 2012; Hutchison, 2013). Moreover, the notion of 
policy convergence across political orientations during periods of financial market 
disequilibria needs further empirical support (Hutchison, 2013). In addition, key studies on 
global financial integration typically examine the United States, the European Union (EU) or 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The current study will add to the 
existing strand of literature by conducting further empirical work concerning the influence of 
the political landscape and global integration on the policymaking process. Furthermore, this 
study will add to existing literature on global financial integration by considering countries 
that are not necessarily members of formal or informal blocs or alliances.  Thus, this study 
will investigate policy framework for resolving financial market disequilibria taking account 
of the influence of the political landscape and global financial integration.   
 
3. Data and Method 
This study analyses developed and developing countries with strong financial markets, where 
governments are likely to implement macroeconomic policies to facilitate financial market 
stability. Based on a report published by the World Economic Forum (2012), the following 
twenty-one countries were selected: the United Kingdom, Australia, the United States, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Canada, Switzerland, Japan, Norway, Malaysia, South Korea, China, 
South Africa, Brazil, Taiwan, Germany, France, Sweden, Austria, Netherlands and Poland. 
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Data is collected from various sources12 and Datastream. The analyses on these countries 
were conducted over the period from 1994 to 2015. This period is chosen because it avoids 
significant structural breaks in the data resulting from the formal establishment of the EU in 
November 1993, as a few of the selected countries are members of the EU. In addition, this 
period captures key financial market imbalances, such as the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis, the 
Dotcom Bubble and the 2008 Financial Crisis.  The study uses quarterly data since 
macroeconomic policies are implemented quarterly or annually. Furthermore, quarterly data 
avoids any under-parametisation problems that may result from using annual data for the 
period of this analysis. 
 
3.1 Identifying Financial Market Imbalances 
In order to identify financial market disequilibria, credit spreads will be used as a proxy based 
on the propositions of Jones (2014) and Krishnamurthy and Muir (2015) as they capture the 
general equilibrium of multiple financial markets. Although credit spreads reflect the general 
equilibrium of financial markets, other proxies are also identified in literature. More 
specifically, three primary proxies for identifying financial market imbalances have emerged 
through existing literature, namely credit spreads, sovereign bond yield spreads and 
government debt-to-GDP ratios. Credit spreads refer to the difference between the yields of 
sovereign bonds and non-sovereign bonds with the same maturity (Sun and Yan, 2012). 
Fluctuations in credit spreads represent changes in the supply of funds provided by financial 
intermediaries and reflect the general equilibrium of financial markets and economies 
(Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012).13 However, fluctuations in credit spreads can also be 
                                                     
12 Sources include Oxford Economics, the Office of National Statistics, the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the 
OECD, Election Resources, Thomson Reuters, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Central 
Bank (ECB) and the central banks or monetary authorities of each country.  
13 A spike in credit spreads indicate that financial intermediaries have inadequate capital and reduce their supply 
of credit as a result, which increases the cost of debt financing and widens credit spreads (Gilchrist and 
Zakrajšek, 2012).  
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attributed to an amalgam of liquidity premiums, the tax treatment of corporate bonds and 
default risks, which limits the effectiveness of credit spreads as a proxy for financial market 
disequilibria (Sun and Yan, 2012).  
 
Sovereign bond yield spreads are the differences between the yields of sovereign bonds in 
different countries with varying credit ratings. High sovereign bond yield spreads reflect high 
default risks, low bond market liquidity and changing risk preferences due to financial market 
and economic uncertainty (Afonso, et al., 2012). The main limitation of sovereign bond yield 
spreads is that they do not significantly reflect conditions prior to financial market 
imbalances (Afonso, et al., 2012).  
 
The debt-to-GDP ratio is the ratio between sovereign debt and GDP, and it is a common 
indicator for default risk. High debt-to-GDP ratios usually suggest that the growth rate of 
debt exceeds the growth rate of GDP, which may induce a recession caused by fiscal 
unsustainability.  However, high debt-to-GDP ratios do not necessarily indicate financial 
market imbalances (Ostry, et al., 2010). 
 
Based on observations of robust methodology in existing literature, the current study uses 
credit spreads as a proxy for financial market disequilibria. Credit spreads indicate the 
severity of financial market disequilibria and economic recessions, and the relationship 
between credit spreads and economic variables holds over varying financial and economic 
conditions (Krishnamurthy and Muir, 2015). Details about the changes in credit spreads for 
each of the 21 sample countries is presented in Appendix 1. 
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To ensure that credit spreads are an appropriate proxy for imbalances in financial markets, a 
VAR Analysis was conducted to examine the short-term relationship between credit spreads 
and the returns of key financial markets: stock, bond, foreign exchange and oil markets (in 
line with Gilchrist and Zakrajšek, 2012). Furthermore, two lag lengths will be used based on 
the suggestions of Jones (2014). A condition for this study is that there must be a relationship 
between credit spreads and the returns of at least one key market for each country in order for 
credit spreads to be used as a proxy. For each of the selected countries, the results of the 
VARs indicated that there is a statistically significant short-term relationship between 
changes in credit spreads and the returns of at least one key financial market. Based on the 
VAR Analysis, it can be concluded that credit spreads primarily reflect equilibrium in bond, 
foreign exchange and oil markets.14  
 
3.2 Evaluating Macroeconomic Policies 
Based on the postulations of Makin (2013)15, the efficacy of government spending in 
resolving financial market disequilibria and stimulating the economy will be evaluated by 
using a VAR Analysis and a Linear Regression Analysis. The models will examine the short-
term and underlying impact of government spending on credit spreads, market interest rates, 
GDP, consumption and investment. In line with Makin (2013), this study will consider two 
lag lengths in the VAR Analysis. Following equations will be used:  
 
∆𝐶𝑆 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝑆 +  𝜀 
 
𝑀𝐼𝑅 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑆 +  𝜀 
                                                     
14 These results are consistent with the propositions of Jones (2014). The results of the VAR Analysis are 
available upon request.  
15 Makin (2013) investigated the macroeconomic policy effectiveness of increased government spending within 
a two-sector open economy framework based on two distinct classes of goods and services – tradables and non-
tradables. The results suggest that increased government spending on both tradables and non-tradables is 
ineffective (or ambiguous) in influencing national output or employment. Consistent with the methodological 
approach of Makin (2013), the current study employs VAR analysis. 
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𝐺𝐷𝑃 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑆 +  𝜀 
 
𝐶 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑆 +  𝜀 
 
𝐼 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑆 +  𝜀 
(1) 
 
Where ∆𝐶𝑆 is the change in credit spreads; MIR is the market interest rate; GDP is the Gross 
Domestic Product; C is consumption; I is investment; GS is government spending; and 𝜀 is 
the error term.  
 
Furthermore, in line with Cenesizoglu and Essid (2012), both a VAR Analysis and a Linear 
Regression Analysis will be conducted to evaluate the effects of liquidity provision on credit 
spreads and the efficacy of central bank interest rates in mitigating financial market 
disequilibria. Additionally, Cenesizoglu and Essid (2012) posited that changes to credit 
spreads might be due to the lack of control variables. Hence, both uncontrolled and controlled 
Linear Regression Analyses will be conducted. The equations being tested are as follows: 
 
∆𝐶𝑆 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐿𝑃 + 𝜀 
 
∆𝐶𝑆 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐿𝑃 + 𝛽2∆𝑟10 + 𝛽3(∆𝑟10)
2 + 𝛽4∆(𝑟10 −  𝑟2) +  𝛽5𝑆𝑀 +  𝜀 
 
∆𝐶𝑆 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑅 + 𝜀 
 
∆𝐶𝑆 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑅 + 𝛽2∆𝑟10 + 𝛽3(∆𝑟10)
2 + 𝛽4∆(𝑟10 −  𝑟2) +  𝛽5𝑆𝑀 +  𝜀 
(2) 
Where ∆𝐶𝑆 is the change in credit spreads; 𝛽0 is the constant or intercept term;𝛽1, 𝛽2, 𝛽3, 𝛽4 
and 𝛽5 are the coefficients; LP is liquidity provision; CBIR is central bank interest rates; 𝑟10 is 
the yield on ten-year sovereign bonds; 𝑟2 is the yield on two-year sovereign bonds; 𝑆𝑀 is the 
returns on the leading stock market in each country; 𝜀 is the error term. 
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3.3 Investigating the Influence of the Political Landscape 
In order to evaluate the influence of the political landscape on macroeconomic policy 
frameworks designed to regress financial market imbalances, a Country-by-Country 
Analysis, One-Way ANOVA Test, Correlation Analysis and a Logit Regression Analysis will 
be employed, following the propositions of Sundquist (2011). First, a Country-by-Country 
Analysis will be used to identify the political orientations of each of the selected countries 
and they will be classified as left-wing, centrist or right-wing. Then, as suggested by 
Sundquist (2011), a One-Way Anova Test will be conducted to determine if governments 
with the same political orientations across the selected countries implemented similar 
macroeconomic policies during periods of financial market disequilibria. A One-Way Anova 
Test will also be used to evaluate the notion of policy convergence, which is in line with 
Samuels and Shugart (2011). A Correlation Analysis will be conducted to observe the 
correlation between political orientations and macroeconomic policies for each of the 
selected countries. Finally, a Logit Regression Analyses will be conducted to elucidate the 
macroeconomic policies chosen by governments with various political orientations to redress 
financial market imbalances, which is in line with Song (2010). The dependent dummy 
variables represent macroeconomic policies implemented during periods of financial market 
disequilibria. In order to create the dependent dummy variables, changes in credit spreads 
that are above or equal to 0.01 will be assigned the value of 1 and all others will be assigned 
the value of 0, as suggested by Jones (2014). This index will then be multiplied by 
government spending, liquidity provision and central bank interest rates. As for the 
independent dummy variables, 1 will denote that the government in office follows the 
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political orientation being analysed and 0 will denote that the government does not16. The 
dependent variable calculation and regression models are as follows: 
 
𝐷𝑉 =  𝑀𝑃 ×  ∆𝐶𝑆𝑥≥0.01 
 
𝐺𝑆𝐹𝑀𝐷 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑂 +  𝜀 
 
𝐿𝑃𝐹𝑀𝐷 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑃𝑂 +  𝜀 
 
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑀𝐷 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝑃𝑂 +  𝜀 
 
(3) 
Where 𝐷𝑉 is the dummy variables created for government spending, liquidity provision and 
central bank interest rates, respectively; 𝑀𝑃 is macroeconomic policies (government 
spending, liquidity provision and central bank interest rates); ∆𝐶𝑆𝑥≥0.01 is changes in credit 
spreads that are above or equal to 0.01; 𝛽0 is the constant or intercept term; 𝐺𝑆𝐹𝑀𝐷 is 
government spending during financial market disequilibria; 𝐿𝑃𝐹𝑀𝐷 is liquidity provision 
during financial market disequilibria; 𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑀𝐷 is central bank interest rates during financial 
market disequilibria; 𝛽1 is the coefficient; 𝑃𝑂 is the dummy variables for the political 
orientations of governments, representing left-wing, centre and right-wing; 𝜀 is the error term.  
 
3.4 Examining the Impact of Global Financial Integration 
In order to evaluate the influence of global financial integration on the macroeconomic 
policies chosen to mitigate financial market imbalances, this study will employ the Covered 
Interest Rate Parity as a proxy, a Logit Regression Analysis and a One-Way ANOVA Test, 
based on the propositions of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) and Cheung and de Haan 
(2013). The dependent dummy variables will be the same index used in 3.3. Regarding the 
Independent dummy variables for the Logit Regression, 0 will denote significant violations of 
                                                     
16 Political orientations were obtained from the Election Resources database and then were confirmed with 
government reports from the selected countries. 
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the Covered Interest Rate Parity and 1 will denote minor or non-existent violations.17 
Moreover, the United States Dollar (USD) will be used as the base currency since many 
countries use the USD as a conventional home currency or peg (Krishnakumar, 2015). A 
One-Way ANOVA Test will then be used to evaluate the notion of policy harmonisation 
across countries during periods of financial market imbalances. The Covered Interest Rate 
Parity condition and the regression models are as follows:  
 
𝐹𝑅𝐴
𝐵
,𝑡
=  𝑆𝑅𝐴
𝐵
,𝑡
(
1 + 𝑟𝐴,𝑡
1 + 𝑟𝐵,𝑡
) 
 
𝐺𝑆𝐹𝑀𝐷 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐺𝐹𝐼 +  𝜀 
 
𝐿𝑃𝐹𝑀𝐷 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐺𝐹𝐼 +  𝜀 
 
𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑀𝐷 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐺𝐹𝐼 +  𝜀 
 
(4) 
Where 𝐹𝑅𝐴
𝐵
,𝑡
 is the forward exchange rate of currency A and currency B; 𝑆𝑅𝐴
𝐵
,𝑡
 is the spot 
exchange rate of currency A and currency B; 𝑟𝐴,𝑡 is the interest rate for borrowing in currency 
A; 𝑟𝐵,𝑡 is the interest rate for borrowing in currency B;  𝛽0 is the constant or intercept term; 
𝐺𝑆𝐹𝑀𝐷 is government spending during financial market disequilibria; 𝐿𝑃𝐹𝑀𝐷 is liquidity 
provision during financial market disequilibria; 𝐶𝐵𝐼𝑅𝐹𝑀𝐷 is central bank interest rates during 
financial market disequilibria; 𝛽1 is the coefficient; 𝐺𝐹𝐼 is the dummy variables for global 
financial integration and 𝜀 is the error term.  
 
 
                                                     
17 Since violations in the Covered Interest Rate Parity occur frequently when quarterly data is used, Jones (2014) 
suggested that violations above or equal to 0.01 should be viewed as low global financial integration and all 
other minor or non-existent violations represent high global financial integration.  
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4. Results and Discussion 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics to provide a general review of the data used in this 
study for the 21 selected countries, namely changes in the following macroeconomic 
variables: government spending, liquidity provision and interest rates.  
 
A visual inspection of Table 1 reveals that all of the selected countries have positive and 
negative changes in government spending, liquidity provision and interest rates. The average 
change in government spending was positive for all of the selected countries except for 
Netherlands and Poland.18 Sweden had the highest average change in government spending 
of 36%, and all other countries with the exception of Netherlands and Poland had changes in 
government spending ranging from 0.3% to 9.5%. Sweden also has the highest standard 
deviation, which indicates instances of significant changes in government spending away 
from the mean. 
 
Canada was observed to have the only negative average change in liquidity provision and 
also reported the highest standard deviation.19 On the other hand, Taiwan has the highest 
average change in liquidity provision as well as the highest standard deviation.20   
 
With regards to interest rates, 18 countries reported a negative average changes in interest 
rates.  This indicates that most of the selected countries have responded to macroeconomic 
disequilibria by lowering interest rates. Only Norway, Singapore and Switzerland have 
average changes in interest rates close to 0%, which indicates that interest rates have been 
                                                     
18 Brady and Lee (2014) postulated that government spending declined from 1971 to 2008 in many countries such as Netherlands and 
Poland due to depleted government resources and parliamentary votes against significant expansionary policies.  
19 A negative average change in liquidity provision may indicate that liquidity provision has been constant for a significant amount of time, 
with any changes being reductions in liquidity provision. 
20 This reflects quantitative easing in Taiwan, which regards the creation of money by central banks in order to provide liquidity to financial 
intermediaries (Kang, 2015). 
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relatively constant over time. Norway also has highest standard deviation relative to changes 
in interest rates. 
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
 
4.2 The Effectiveness of Fiscal and Monetary Policies in Resolving Financial Market 
Disequilibria 
The first aim of this study evaluates the efficacy of macroeconomic policies implemented to 
resolve financial market disequilibria by examining the impact of government spending, 
liquidity provision, and interest rate policies on credit spreads.  
 
In evaluating the effectiveness of government spending in reducing credit spreads over time, 
the results of the Linear Regression Analysis indicate that government spending does not 
impact credit spreads for any of the selected countries at a significance level 5% level. As for 
the short-term relationship between credit spreads and government spending, changes in 
government spending significantly influenced changes in credit spreads for only 3 of the 
selected countries, namely Canada, Norway and Poland as seen in Table 2. For Canada, the 
second lag of changes in government spending influenced changes in credit spreads with a 
coefficient of -34.0421. Similarly, for Norway, the first lag of changes in government 
spending influenced changes in credit spreads with a coefficient of -10.05. Finally, the second 
lag of changes in government spending in Poland influenced changes in credit spreads with a 
coefficient of 0.33. Since only 3 of the selected countries indicate a significant relationship 
between government spending and credit spreads, hypothesis 1 cannot be rejected. As such, 
                                                     
21 In other words, a one-unit increase in government spending reduces changes in credit spreads by 34.04 in 
Canada. 
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these results strongly support hypothesis 1. These results suggest that governments should not 
implement government spending as a tool to facilitate stability in financial markets.  
 
A central contention of theoretical analyses of fiscal policies is that prudent government 
spending which does not exacerbate public debt serves to mitigate uncertainty in the 
economy, which helps reduce risk premia and credit spreads (Hairault, et al., 2012). 
However, one particular limitation of government spending is the inherent lag in its 
implementation (Kobayashi, 2013).  Designing government spending policies takes 
considerable time, which limits its effect on consumer confidence. Furthermore, the 
government budget constraint can also retard the responsiveness and efficacy of government 
spending (Alesina and Ardagna, 2009). 
 
[Insert Table 2 and 3 about here] 
 
Furthermore, the results of the linear regression analyses indicate that changes in government 
spending influence interest rates, GDP, consumption and investment for some of the selected 
countries. In the market interest rates analysis, changes in government spending only 
influenced changes in interest rates for Malaysia, as seen in Table 3. Although these results 
indicate that an increase government spending reduces market interest rates, the R-squared 
value of this model is quite low, suggesting that numerous other factors contribute to the 
reduction in interest rates22. Hence, in Malaysia, government expenditure is a viable 
macroeconomic policy in stimulating the economy by reducing market interest rates, which 
facilitates borrowing. Only 4 of the selected countries: Malaysia, China, South Africa and 
France, demonstrated that government spending impacts GDP. An increase in government 
                                                     
22 With a coefficient of -0.040, a one-unit increase in government spending reduces changes in market interest 
rates by 0.040. However, the R-squared value indicates that only 15.4% of the variance of the regression model 
is explained by government spending.  
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spending causes an increase in GDP in Malaysia, China and South Africa, while an increase 
in government spending reduced GDP in France.23 However, only Malaysia and China have 
reliable regression results based on the R-squared measure. As such, though government 
spending may stimulate GDP in Malaysia and China, this policy may not be effective in the 
other selected countries. 
 
The regression analysis of the impact of changes in government spending on changes in 
consumption had statistically significant results for the United Kingdom, Australia, Hong 
Kong, France and Austria, as shown in Table 3. Of these countries, only Australia indicated a 
positive relationship between government expenditure and consumption. In contrast, 
government spending reduces consumption in the United Kingdom, Hong Kong, France and 
Austria.24  However, the R-squared values are relatively low for this regression model.  
 
Regarding investment, 6 of the selected countries, namely the United States, Malaysia, South 
Korea, China, Brazil, and France, demonstrated a statistically significant relationship between 
government spending and investment, as seen in Table 3. All of these countries expect for the 
United States and France, demonstrated a positive relationship between government spending 
and investment.25 However, only the regression models of China and Brazil are sufficiently 
                                                     
23 A 1-unit increase in government expenditure causes changes in GDP to increase in Malaysia, China and South 
Africa by 0.083, 0.248 and 0.156, respectively. In contrast, the regression model for France indicates that a 1-
unit increase in government spending reduces GDP changes by 0.292. This reflects the ‘crowding out’ effect 
and Furceri and Sousa (2011) found similar results. 
24 A 1-unit increase in government expenditure reduces consumption in the United Kingdom, Hong, France and 
Austria by 0.197, 0.169, 0.268 and 4.199, respectively. Beyond the ‘crowding out’ effect, one explanation for 
these results is that additional government spending may be financed by an increase in taxes, which reduces 
disposable income and subsequently reduces consumption.  
25 A 1-unit increase in government spending increases changes in investment in Malaysia, South Korea, China 
and Brazil by 0.078, 0.6673, 0.217 and 0.779, respectively. In contrast, a 1-unit increase in government 
spending reduces changes in investment in the United States and France by 0.591 and 0.810, respectively. 
Hence, the United States and France demonstrate that government expenditure may not necessarily foster 
investor confidence.   
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reliable, which suggests that government spending is an effective macroeconomic policy for 
stimulating investment in China and Brazil.  
 
In summary, government spending only has a statistically significant relationship with 
interest rates, GDP, consumption and investment for a small number of the selected countries, 
providing only limited support for hypothesis 2. Other studies such as Auerbach and 
Gorodnichenko (2013) reached similar conclusions regarding the influence of government 
spending on market interest rates and private investment, while some studies such as 
Backmann and Sims (2012) found that government spending increases GDP and 
consumption. The effect of government spending on these variables ultimately depends on 
how markets react to a shock in government spending. Hence, though there is a relationship 
between financial markets and the larger economy, there may not necessarily be transitivity 
amongst government spending, the economy, and financial markets, which limits the efficacy 
of fiscal policies as a stabilisation tool for financial markets. 
 
In evaluating the effect of liquidity provision on credit spreads, both uncontrolled and 
controlled regressions were conducted, which allows the real effects of liquidity provision to 
be elucidated by accounting for other exogenous variables that may impact credit spreads 
(Cenesizoglu and Essid, 2012). VARs were then conducted to analyse the short-term impact 
of liquidity provision on credit spreads.  
 
The results suggest that, for the uncontrolled regression, only Canada demonstrated a 
significant relationship between liquidity provision and credit spreads, with an increase in 
liquidity provision reducing credit spreads as seen in Table 4. Regarding the controlled 
regression, only Switzerland and Poland provide evidence to support the notion that liquidity 
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provision has an impact on changes in credit spreads. For Switzerland, an increase in liquidity 
provision reduces changes in credit spreads; whereas, a reduction in liquidity provision 
reduces changes in credit spreads in Poland.  Nevertheless, the adjusted R-squared in Table 4 
is low for both of these regression models, which suggests that the results may not be 
sufficiently reliable. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
 
Regarding the short-term impact of changes in liquidity provision on changes in credit 
spreads, only China and Austria had statistically significant results.  For China, the results 
suggested a positive relationship between the first lag of changes in liquidity provision and 
changes in credit spreads (a coefficient of 0.441 and a standard error of 0.216).  Similarly, the 
regression results for Austria indicates that liquidity provision has a positive impact on credit 
spreads (a coefficient of 9.778 and a standard error of 4.048).  These results suggest that 
liquidity provision may not be a suitable macroeconomic stabilising policy in the short-run as 
it may have destabilising effects26.  
 
In summary, the effects of liquidity provision on credit spreads were only statistically 
significant for 5 countries. Furthermore, these results indicate that liquidity provision may 
have destabilising effects and governments should reduce liquidity provision in order to 
resolve financial market disequilibria. Therefore, these results support hypothesis 3. This is 
consistent with Mishkin (2011) who argued that liquidity provision might actually increase 
systemic risk by encouraging excessive leveraging in the financial system, which is 
detrimental during periods of financial disequilibria. Fragmentation in the financial system 
also explains the ineffectiveness of liquidity provision in that financial intermediaries may be 
                                                     
26 This result is not presented in the Tables. 
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hesitant to lend or participant in the interbank market when financial market disequilibria 
place pressure on their liquidity ratios (Taylor and Williams, 2009). 
 
Similar to the analysis on the efficacy of liquidity provision, the analysis on the impact of 
central bank interest rates on credit spreads employed both uncontrolled and controlled 
regressions. In addition, VARs were then conducted to analyse the short-term impact of 
liquidity provision on credit spreads. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
 
Table 5 presents the statistically significant results of the uncontrolled and controlled 
regression analysis of the impact of changes in central bank interest rates on changes in credit 
spreads. In the uncontrolled regression, seven of the selected countries, namely Australia, 
Singapore, Hong Kong, Canada, South Korea, South Africa and Germany, show strong 
evidence to suggest that changes in central bank interest rates have a positive impact on 
changes in credit spreads.  Hence, a reduction in central bank interest rates reduces changes 
in credit spreads.  In contrast, the United States and Taiwan indicate that an increase in 
changes in central bank interest rates reduces credit spreads.  However, the only sufficiently 
reliable regression model is that of the United States based on the R-square. Regarding the 
controlled regression, seven of the selected countries show evidence to support the notion that 
central bank interest rates have a significant influence on credit spreads. The impact of 
central bank interest rates on credit spreads is positive for the majority of the sample 
countries, with South Africa having the highest change in credit spreads resulting from the 
adjustment of central bank interest rates.  
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As for the short-term impact of central bank interest rates, Norway, China and South Africa 
show strong evidence to support the notion that changes in central bank interest rates impact 
changes in credit spreads (coefficients of 0.345, 0.423, 0.427 and a standard error of 2.24, 
2.20, 3.66, respectively)27.  These results indicate a positive relationship between central bank 
interest rates and credit spreads.  In summary, these results indicate that central bank interest 
rates should be reduced in order to decrease credit spreads and, ultimately, resolve financial 
market disequilibria. Essentially, a reduction in central bank interest rates facilitates lending 
operations and reduces volatility within financial markets (Censesizoglu and Essid, 2012). 
Though some of these regression models may not be sufficiently reliable, thirteen different 
countries indicate a significant relationship between central bank interest rates and credit 
spreads. Therefore, these results support hypothesis 4. These results are consistent with 
Woodford (2012) who suggested that increasing interest rates before imbalances materialise 
in financial markets significantly impedes excessive leveraging; and, lowering interest rates 
during periods of financial market disequilibria can mitigate funding inadequacies in the 
financial system. However, Gali (2013) found that proactive interest rate policies could 
exacerbate imbalances in financial markets by increasing volatility. Hence, reactive interest 
rate policies may be more optimal. Overall, the findings in this section provide strong support 
for hypotheses 1, 3, and 4 but limited support for hypothesis 2.28 
 
4.2 The Impact of Political Ideologies 
This subsection provides findings for the second aim of this study which was to elucidate the 
impact of the political orientation of government in office on the fiscal and monetary policies 
chosen to resolve financial market disequilibria.  
 
                                                     
27 These results are not presented in the Tables. 
28 Details of individual country results are available upon request. 
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In elucidating the influence of left-wing and right-wing governments on the policymaking 
process, a One-Way ANOVA Test, a Logit Regression Analysis and a Correlation Analysis 
were employed as suggested in Section 3. Due to redundancies in the dummy variables, 
Singapore, Norway, Malaysia, China and Sweden were not included in the Logit Regression 
Analysis and Correlation Analysis.   
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Table 6 shows the statistically significant results of the One-Way ANOVA Test regarding 
macroeconomic policies implemented by governments based on their political orientation 
during periods of financial market disequilibria.  Regarding left-wing governments, there was 
no significant difference between countries in terms of the average change in government 
spending and liquidity provision administered when there were imbalances in financial 
markets. Furthermore, right-wing governments of the selected countries implemented similar 
changes in government spending during periods of disequilibria in financial markets.  The 
results may allude to the inherent macroeconomic policy preferences of left-wing and right-
wing governments but may also suggest similarities in the government budget and central 
bank constraints. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
 
Table 7 shows the Logit Regression and Correlation results of countries that demonstrated a 
statistically significant relationship between political orientations and macroeconomic 
policies implemented during periods of financial market disequilibria. During disequilibria in 
financial markets, the United States and Brazil demonstrate that left-wing governments 
reduce government spending; whereas, right-wing governments increase government 
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spending.29 Regarding liquidity provision, the United Kingdom, Australia and Poland 
indicate that left-wing governments increase liquidity provision, while right-wing 
governments decrease liquidity provision.30 In contrast, Brazil and Taiwan indicate that left-
wing governments reduce liquidity provision and right-wing governments increase liquidity 
provision. As for interest rates, only France provides evidence to support the notion that left-
wing governments reduce interest rates and right-wing governments increase interest rates.31 
Indeed, these models may not be sufficiently reliable because the R-squared values are 
relatively low. 
 
In summary, with regard to the selected countries, although left-wing governments 
implemented similar changes in government spending and liquidity provision and right-wing 
governments also administered similar changes in government spending, there is insufficient 
evidence to support the notion that left-wing governments have an inclination to choose 
proactive macroeconomic policies and right-wing governments have a tendency to choose 
reactive macroeconomic policies.  Therefore, the results suggest that there is limited support 
for hypothesis 5.  In contrast, Song (2010) found strong evidence supporting the notion that 
right-wing governments are more inclined to implement policies that are reactive in nature. 
The underlying premise is that right-wing governments tend to facilitate market solutions 
rather than intervene (Woodford, 2012). However, this view is not only held by right-wing 
                                                     
29 An increase in government spending is proactive in nature because it directly stimulates consumption and 
investment and it fosters confidence during financial market disequilibria and recessions (Bachmann and Sims, 
2012; Auerback and Gorodnichenko, 2013). Whereas, a reduction in government spending is a reactive 
macroeconomic policy as it inadvertently stimulates consumption and investment by improving the government 
budget balance, which reduces expectations of future increases in tax and interest rates (Cwik and Wieland, 
2011; Ramey, 2012).  
30 An increase in liquidity provision is a proactive macroeconomic policy because it improves funding shortfalls 
in the financial system, facilitates lending, reduces credit risk and causes a contraction in credit spreads 
(Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 2011). 
31 A reduction in central bank interest rates is a proactive macroeconomic policy because it facilitates lending 
activities by lowering the cost of borrowing, which reduces volatility in financial markets (Cenesizoglu and 
Essid, 2012). On the other hand, an increase in central bank interest rates indirectly improves financial market 
conditions by increasing sovereign bond yields and subsequently reducing credit spreads (Gilchrist and 
Zakrajšek, 2011). 
32 
 
governments but also proponents of classical and neoclassical economic theories which 
suggest that internal mechanisms such as the price system and wages ultimately facilitate 
equilibrium in economies so government intervention should be limited (Aspromourgos, 
2012). As such, left-wing and centrist governments may also hold this perspective. 
 
In evaluating the influence of centrist governments on the policymaking process, a One-Way 
ANOVA Test, a Logit Regression Analysis and a Correlation Analysis were used. Regarding 
the selected countries, only Japan, Netherlands and Poland had radical centrist governments 
at any point within the study period. The results in Table 6 indicate that centrist governments 
in Japan, Netherlands and Poland implemented similar changes in government spending and 
central bank interest rates. These results suggest that centre governments may inherently 
prefer government spending and central bank interest rates as macroeconomic policies to 
redress financial market imbalances, but numerous other factors such as automatic fiscal 
stabilisers32 can cause similarities in macroeconomic policies.  
 
Regarding the influence of centrist governments on the choice of macroeconomic policies 
implemented to resolve financial market disequilibria, only Netherlands provided evidence 
that there is a significant relationship between centrist governments and macroeconomic 
policies; specifically that centrist governments have an inclination to increase liquidity 
provision in order to mitigate imbalances in financial markets. However, based on its R-
squared value (6.6%) the result was deemed not reliable33. 
 
In summary, though the centrist governments of Japan, Netherlands and Poland implemented 
similar changes in government expenditure and central bank interest rates, there is inadequate 
                                                     
32 Automatic stabilisers are policies that automatically adjust to economic conditions (Veld, et al., 2012).  
33 This result is not presented in the Tables. 
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evidence to ascertain whether or not centre governments are inherently responsive to 
financial market disequilibria. Therefore, there is limited support for hypothesis 6. Moreover, 
radical centrism is uncommon, with only three of the twenty-one selected countries having 
radical centre governments between 1993 and 2015. 
 
The notion of policy convergence across political orientations was evaluated by employing a 
One-Way Anova Test between left-wing, centrist and right-wing governments relative to 
macroeconomic policies implemented during periods of financial market disequilibria.  
 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
 
Table 8 shows that results of the One-Way Anova Test used to determine whether or not 
there were similarities in the macroeconomic policies implemented by left-wing, centrist and 
right-wing governments when there were imbalances in financial markets. These results 
provide strong support for the notion of policy convergence during financial market 
disequilibria, as there were no significant differences in changes in government spending, 
liquidity provision and interest rates across the selected countries. Hence, governments 
implemented similar macroeconomic policies irrespective of political orientations. Therefore, 
there is strong support for hypothesis 7.  These results are consistent with Samuels and 
Shugart (2011) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2013) who found that governments with 
different political orientations tend to implement similar policies when trying to mitigate 
financial market disequilibria. As such, macroeconomic policy paradigms for resolving 
financial market disequilibria are not necessarily determined by political orientations 
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(Crawford, 2012). Overall, the results in this section provide strong support for hypotheses 7 
and limited support for hypotheses 5 and 6.34 
 
4.3 The Influence of Global Financial Integration 
This subsection provides findings for the third aim of this study, which regards the influence 
of global financial integration on the macroeconomic policies chosen to redress financial 
market imbalances.  
 
The influence of global financial integration on government spending during financial market 
imbalances was evaluated by conducting a Logit Regression Analysis. Since the dummy 
variables of Hong Kong and China were redundant, these countries were not included in this 
analysis. For this analysis, none of the 21 selected countries demonstrated that there is a 
significant relationship between global financial integration and government spending. This 
suggests that governments do not increase or decrease government spending when there is a 
high degree of global financial integration.  Therefore, the results suggest that there is strong 
support for hypothesis 835. However, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) found that global 
financial integration usually causes governments to increase expenditure when there are 
imbalances in financial markets or economic recessions. The underlying premise is that 
governments try to supplement beneficial fiscal policy spillovers from countries resulting 
from a high degree of global financial integration (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko, 2013). For 
instance, expansionary fiscal policies in one country may increase foreign investment in 
another country if there is a high degree of global financial integration with negligible or 
limited capital controls. Indeed, disparities between this study and that of Auerbach and 
                                                     
34 A table indicating the political ideologies of the selected countries and all results of the various analyses are 
available upon request from the authors.  
35 This result is not presented in the paper. 
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Gorodnichenko (2013) are primarily due to their exclusion of countries with? erratic 
government spending. 
 
The influence of global financial integration on liquidity provision during financial market 
disequilibria was also examined by employing a Logit Regression Analysis, with Hong Kong 
and China not included in this analysis.  
 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
 
The results of the Logit Regression in Table 9 regarding the relationship between global 
financial integration and liquidity provision suggest that only the United Kingdom, the 
United States, South Korea and Taiwan showed strong evidence to support the notion that 
global financial integration influences liquidity provision. Both the United Kingdom and 
Taiwan indicate that governments tend to increase liquidity provision when there is a high 
degree of global financial integration in order to resolve financial market disequilibria.36 In 
contrast, the United States and South Korea demonstrate that global financial integration 
leads governments to reduce liquidity provision during financial market imbalances.37 
However, the only moderately reliable model is that of South Korea. Nevertheless, the notion 
that global financial integration influences liquidity provision is only supported by a small 
number of the selected countries. Therefore there is only limited support for hypothesis 9.  
 
                                                     
36 During financial market disequilibria, the credit supply of the global interbank market is limited, which 
exacerbates funding shortfalls for financial intermediaries that rely on this market (Iyer, et al., 2013). As such, 
governments may increase liquidity provision to mitigate these shortfalls.  
37 Fecht et al. (2012) and Rey (2015) alluded to the fact that liquidity leakages are prominent in countries that 
have a high degree of global financial integration, which suggests the United Kingdom and Taiwan have 
increased liquidity provision to circumvent liquidity leakages. 
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A Logit Regression Analysis was also conducted to evaluate the influence of global financial 
integration on adjustments in central bank interest rates, with Hong Kong and China also 
being excluded from this analysis. The statistically significant results of the Logit Regression 
Analysis showed that only Poland out of the 21 countries studied indicated a significant 
relationship between global financial integration and central bank interest rates. Since only 
one country supports the notion that global financial integration influences central banks to 
reduce credit spreads, there is no support for hypothesis 1038. Mishkin (2009) also found that 
global financial integration does not influence interest rate policies. Rather than directly 
influencing interest rate policies implemented during financial market disequilibria, global 
financial integration may influence the effects of interest rates on financial markets and 
economies (Mishkin, 2009). As such, monetary policies are likely to be determined by more 
endogenous factors such as price stability (Mishkin, 2009). 
 
Finally, in evaluating the notion of global financial integration inducing policy harmonisation 
during periods of financial market disequilibria, a One-Way Anova Test was conducted 
which determines whether or not there were significant differences in macroeconomic 
policies implemented by governments across the selected countries.  
 
[Insert Table 10 about here] 
 
The results of Table 10 indicate that there were significant differences in the average changes 
in government spending, liquidity provision and central bank interest rates implemented by 
governments as stabilisation policies when there were high degrees of global financial 
integration. This suggests that governments are generally autonomous when designing and 
                                                     
38 This result is not presented in the paper. 
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implementing macroeconomic policies to resolve financial market imbalances. Therefore, 
these results provide strong evidence against hypothesis 11. Fiscal policies such as 
government spending are often determined by economic cycles and the government budget 
constraint, which influence the level of tax revenues and the availability of funding for 
governments (Gali, 2013). Indeed, countries with high degrees of global financial integration 
may have different economic cycles that require different levels of government spending. 
Moreover, monetary policies are often based on targets set for inflation rates, interest rates, 
and three-month Libor rates, which differ across countries (Gali, 2013). In addition, central 
banks that have insufficient capital may not be able to implement extraordinary measures 
such as the Term Auction Facility in the United States during periods of financial market 
disequilibria (Stella, 2009). As such, macroeconomic policies implemented to resolve 
financial market disequilibria are likely to be different across countries even if there is a high 
degree of global financial integration. Overall, the findings of this study provide strong 
support for hypotheses 8, limited support for hypotheses 9, no support for hypothesis 10 and 
strong support against hypothesis 11.  
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
The 2008 Financial Crisis is a supreme example of the cataclysmic effects resulting from 
financial market disequilibria that are not effectively resolved by governments39. However, 
the task of identifying the role of macroeconomic policies in supplementing macroprudential 
regulation has been relatively elusive due to uncertainty regarding the efficacy of fiscal and 
monetary policies (Pasquariello, 2014). The findings of the first objective help to elucidate an 
effective policy framework for governments and monetary authorities to implement in efforts 
to resolve financial market disequilibria. While some studies such as Delong et al. (2012) 
                                                     
39 See, for instance, Taylor (2009) and Tanzi (2015) for a comprehensive review concerning macroeconomic 
policies and financial crisis. 
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gave credence to government spending as a stabilisation tool, other studies such as Woodford 
(2011) posited that government spending is more effective at increasing GDP and private 
investment. This study provides further clarity on the efficacy of government spending, 
postulating that governments should abstain from increasing expenditure during periods of 
financial market disequilibria because this expansionary policy does not effectively resolve 
imbalances in financial markets. Moreover, government spending during periods of financial 
market disequilibria has negligible effects on interest rates, GDP, consumption, and private 
investment. Disequilibria in financial markets limit credit availability and increase risk 
premia, making it more difficult for governments to finance their deficits (Alesina and 
Ardagna, 2009). Hence, government spending during these periods may have destabilising 
effects. As such, governments should maintain prudent expenditure when there are financial 
market disequilibria as a more balanced budget may foster confidence in financial markets. 
As for monetary policies, interest rates should be the primary stabilisation tool of monetary 
authorities while liquidity provision should be secondary within their policy framework. 
Central to this proposition is the notion that the efficacy of liquidity provision is determined 
by the degree of cohesion within financial markets. Fragmented financial markets retard the 
efficacy of liquidity provision in resolving financial market disequilibria (Taylor and 
Williams, 2009). It is imperative that monetary authorities first evaluate the intrinsic structure 
or cohesion of financial markets before injecting liquidity, but this may limit the 
responsiveness of monetary authorities to financial market disequilibria.  On the other hand, 
interest rate policies may be relatively more effective in resolving financial market 
disequilibria. Based on the findings of this study and propositions of Mishkin (2011) and Gali 
(2013), interest rates should be reduced after financial market disequilibria materialise rather 
than increased before imbalances develop. Therefore, a synthesis of prudent government 
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spending, conditional liquidity provision and reduced interest rates may effectively resolve 
financial market disequilibria. 
 
The findings of the second and third aims of this study are more pertinent to market 
participants such as households and investors as they help to mitigate uncertainty regarding 
the choices governments make relative to the macroeconomic policies implemented to 
resolve financial market disequilibria. This study adds to existing knowledge on the influence 
of the political landscape throughout the policy-making process during periods of financial 
distress. Regarding the influence of the political landscape, studies such as Song (2010) 
suggested that right-wing governments have an inclination to maintain policy frameworks 
that are reactive in nature while left-wing governments take a more proactive stance in 
resolving financial market disequilibria. Contrary to the postulations of Song (2010), this 
study posits that political orientations do not influence governments’ choice of 
macroeconomic stabilisation policies. Rather, governments with different political ideologies 
are likely to implement similar policies during periods of financial market disequilibria. As 
such, partisan changes in governments do not necessarily change the paradigm of 
macroeconomic policies aimed at mitigating imbalances in financial markets. Hence, market 
participants should not base consumption or investment bundles during financial market 
disequilibria on the political orientation of the government in office. When there are financial 
market disequilibria, market participants can expect newly elected governments with 
different political ideologies to follow prominent policy frameworks. As for global financial 
integration, many studies such as Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013) and Feentra and 
Taylor (2014) suggested that a high degree of financial integration between countries leads 
governments to increase expenditure and liquidity provision during periods of financial 
market disequilibria. However, this study suggests that global financial integration does not 
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influence the macroeconomic policies chosen to mitigate imbalances in financial markets. 
Furthermore, global financial integration does not cause countries to coordinate 
macroeconomic stabilisation policies. Hence, if capital controls are reduced or the degree of 
global financial integration increases, market participants should expect the macroeconomic 
policy framework for resolving financial market imbalances to remain the same. Therefore, 
there should be less uncertainty during financial market disequilibria if changes occur in the 
political landscape or in the degree of global financial integration.  
 
Overall, the results of this study elucidated the efficacy of macroeconomic policies in 
redressing financial market imbalances and provided insights on the influence of the political 
landscape and global financial integration of the policymaking process. This study has found 
that government spending does not significantly mitigate imbalances in financial markets and 
may have destabilising effects since it has a limited impact on market interest rates, GDP, 
consumption and investment. Furthermore, liquidity provision is also not an effective 
macroeconomic policy for facilitating stability within financial markets. However, this study 
has found that reductions in central bank interest rates significantly reduce credit spreads and 
mitigate imbalances in financial market. As such, an appropriate policy framework would be 
prudent government spending, conditional liquidity provision, and a reduction in interest 
rates following the development of financial market disequilibria.  
 
As for the impact of the political landscape, this study has found that political orientations do 
not significantly influence the macroeconomic policies chosen to resolve financial market 
disequilibria. Instead, macroeconomic policies are likely to be the same across political 
orientations when there are financial market disequilibria. Moreover, this study shows strong 
evidence to support the notion that imbalances in financial markets cause policy convergence 
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across political orientations. This study has also found that government spending, liquidity 
provision and central bank interest rates implemented during periods of financial market 
disequilibria may not be significantly influenced by global financial integration. Finally, this 
study has found strong evidence against the notion that financial market imbalances cause 
policy harmonisation across countries with high degrees of global financial integration.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
42 
 
6. References 
Acemoglu, A. and Robinson, J. A., 2013. Economics versus Politics: Pitfalls of Policy 
Advice, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(2), pp.173-192. 
Acharya, V.V., and Naqvi, H., 2012. The Seeds of a Crisis: A Theory of Bank Liquidity and 
Risk – Taking Over the Business Cycle, Journal of Financial Economics, 106(2), 
pp.349-366. 
Afonso, A. and Sousa, R.M., 2011. What are the effects of fiscal policy on asset markets?. 
Economic Modelling, 28(4), pp.1871-1890.  
Afonso, A., Arghyrou, M., and Kontonikas, A., 2012. The Determinants of Sovereign Bond 
Yield Spreads in the EMU, ISEG Economics Working Paper No. 36. 
Ahmed, A. A. and van Hulten, A., 2014. Financial Globalization in Botswana and Nigeria: A 
Critique of the Threshold Paradigm, The Review of Black Political Economy, 
2014(41), pp.177-203. 
Alesina, A. F. and Ardagna, S., 2009. Large Changes in Fiscal Policy Taxes Versus 
Spending, NBER Working Paper No. 15438.  
Aspromourgos, T., 2012. Competing Schools of Economic Thought, The European Journal 
of the History of Economic Thought, 19(1), pp.140-144. 
Auerbach, A.J. and Gorodnichenko, Y., 2013. Output spillovers from fiscal policy. The 
American Economic Review, 103(3), pp.141-146. 
Bachmann, R. and Sims, E.R., 2012. Confidence and the transmission of government 
spending shocks. Journal of Monetary Economics, 59(3), pp.235-249. 
Bask, M., 2012. Asset Price Misalignments and Monetary Policy, International Journal of 
Finance and Economics, 21(17), pp.221-241. 
Bernanke, B.S., Gertler, M. and Gilchrist, S., 1999. The financial accelerator in a quantitative 
business cycle framework. Handbook of macroeconomics, 1, pp.1341-1393. 
Bjornskov, C. and Potrafke, N., 2011. Politics and Privatization in Central and Eastern 
Europe, Economics of Transition, 19(2), pp.201-230.  
Brady, D. and Lee, H. Y., 2014. The rise and fall of government spending in affluent 
democracies, 1971-2008, Journal of European Social Policy, 24(1), pp.56-79. 
Blanchard, O. J., Romer, D., Spence, M., and Stiglitz, J. E., 2012. In the Wake of the Crisis: 
Leading Economists Reassess Economic Policy. London: The MIT Press.  
Cason, T. N. and Samek, A. S., 2014. Visual Representation and Observational Learning in 
Asset Market Bubbles, Journal of Economic Science Association Working Paper. 
Cenesizoglu, T., and Essid, B., 2012. The Effect of Monetary Policy on Credit Spreads, 
Journal of Financial Research, 35(4), pp.581-613.  
Cheung, Y.W. and de Haan J., 2013. The Evolving Role of China in the Global Economy. 
Cambridge: MIT Press.  
43 
 
Corbett, J., and Xu, Y., 2015. Measuring Financial Integration: The Network Approach, 
Centre for International Finance and Regulation Working Paper Series No. 06/2015.  
Correa, E. and Girón, A., 2013. U.S. Federal Reserve Monetary Policy and the First Crisis of 
Securitization Mexico and Latin America, 1994-1995, International Journal of 
Political Economy, 42(3), pp.84-98. 
Crawford, J. T., 2012. The ideological objectionable premise model: Predicting biased 
political judgments on the left and right. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
48 (1), pp. 138-151. 
Cwik, T., and Wieland, V., 2011. Keynesian Government spending multipliers and spillovers 
in the euro area. Economic Policy, 26 (67), pp.493-549. 
Delong, J. B., Summers, L. H., Feldstein, M., and Ramey, V. A., 2012. Fiscal Policy in a 
Depressed Economy, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 44(1), pp. 233-297.  
Driffill, J., 2013. Financial Shocks, Unemployment and Public Policy, The Manchester 
School, 81(S2), pp.1-15.  
Emmons, W. R. and Noeth, B. J., 2013. Economic Vulnerability and Financial Fragility, 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review, September/ October 2013, 95(5), pp.361-
388. 
Evanoff, D. D., Kaufman, G. C., and Malliaris, A. G., 2012. New Perspectives on Asset Price 
Bubbles. Oxford University Press.   
Fecht, F., Gruner, H.P., and Hartmann, P., 2012. Financial integration, specialization, and 
systemic risk. Journal of International Economics, 88(1) pp.150-161. 
Feenstra, R.C. and Taylor, A.M. (2014) Globalization in an Age of Crisis: Multilateral 
Economic Cooperation in the Twenty-first Century, Chicago; London: the University 
of Chicago Press. 
Fratzscher, M., 2012. Capital flows, push versus pull factors and the global financial crisis, 
Journal of International Economics, 88(2), pp.341–356. 
Fredriksson, P. G.,  Wang, L., and Warren, P. L., 2013. Party Politics, Governors, and 
Economic Policy, Southern Economic Journal, 80(1), pp.106-126.  
Furceri, D. and Sousa, R. M., 2011. The Impact of Government Spending on the Private 
Sector: Crowding‐out versus Crowding‐in Effects. Kyklos, 64(4), pp.516-533. 
Gadanecz, B., and Mehrota, A., 2014. The exchange rate, real economy and financial 
markets. BIS Papers No. 73. 
Gali, J., 2013. Monetary Policy and Rational Asset Price Bubbles, American Economic 
Review, 104(3), pp.721-752.  
Gilchrist, S. and Zakrajšek, E., 2012. Credit spreads and business cycle fluctuations. The 
American Economic Review, 102(4), pp.1692-1720. 
Goldberg, L. S., 2013. Banking Globalization, Transmission, and Monetary Policy 
Autonomy,  NBER Working Paper Series No. 19497. 
44 
 
Grant, W., and Wilson, G. K., 2012. The Consequences of the Global Financial Crisis: The 
Rhetoric of Reform and Regulation. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Greenberg, J. and Cohe, L. R., 2014. Equity and Justice in Social Behavior.  London: 
Academic Press.  
Gwilym, R., 2013. The Monetary Policy Implications of Behavioural Asset Bubbles, 
Southern Economic Journal, 80(1), pp.252-270. 
Hairault, J. O., Henin, P. Y., and Portier F., 2012. Business Cycles and Macroeconomic 
Stability: Should We Rebuild Built-in stabilizers? Springer Science and Business 
Media.  
Hanson, S. G., and Stein, J. C., 2015. Monetary policy and long-term real rates. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 115(3), pp. 429-448.  
Hayek, F. A., 2012. Law, Legislation and Liberty. London: Routledge. 
Hayford, M. D. and Malliaris, A. G., 2008. Financial Instabilities and Risk Management by 
Central Banks. Economic Journal, 28(2), pp.123-157. 
Huang, M. and Yeh, L., 2015. Should the Fed take extra action for the recent housing bubble? 
Evidence from asymmetric transitory shocks, Journal of Economics and Finance, 
2015(39), pp.762-781. 
Hutchison, T. W., 2013. Economics and Economic Policy in Britain, 1946 - 1966. London: 
Routledge. 
Iyer, R., Peydro, JL., da Rocha-Lopes, S., and Schoar A., 2013. Interbank Liquidity Crunch 
and the Firm Credit Crunch: Evidence from the 2007-2009 Crisis, The Review of 
Financial Studies, 27(1) pp.347-372. 
Jones, B., 2014. Identifying Speculative Bubbles: A Two-Pillar Surveillance Framework. 
IMF Working Paper Series No.14/208. 
Junevicius, A. and Justinaviciene, K., 2010. EU Taxation Policy during Financial Crisis. ISSN 
European Integration Studies, 2010(4), pp.29-43.  
Kang, H. H., 2015. The Effects of a Non-traditional Monetary Policy on Housing Prices in 
Taiwan, Humanities and Social Sciences Reviews, 3(1) pp.38-41. 
Karras, G., 2014. Fiscal Policy Spillovers through Trade Openness, Journal of Economic 
Integration, 29(3) pp.563-581. 
Kobayashi, M., 2013. Housing bubbles and macro-prudential supervision: a case study from 
Japan in 1980’s and 90’s, Housing Finance International, 28(1), pp.13-18. 
Koenig, G., and Zeyneloglu, I., 2010. When does financial integration matter for fiscal policy 
is a currency union? A welfare-based approach, Economic Modeling, 27(3), pp. 620-
630. 
König, P. and Pothier, D., 2015. Bubbles and Monetary Policy: To Burst or not to Burst? (No. 
55). DIW Roundup: Politik im Fokus. 
45 
 
Kose, M. A., Prasad, E., Rogoff, K., and Wei, S-J., 2006. Financial Globalization:  A 
Reprisal, NBER Working Paper Series No. 12484. 
Krishnakumar, S., 2015. Global Imbalances and Bretton Woods II Postulate, Centre for 
Economic Studies and Planning Working Paper Series No. 460. 
Krishnamurthy, A. and Muir. T., 2015. Credit Spreads and the Severity of Financial Crises, 
Stanford University Working Paper.  
Krishnamurthy, A. and Vissing-Jorgensen, A., 2011. The Effects of Quantitative Easing on 
Interest Rates: Channels and Implications for Policy, NBER Working Paper Series No. 
17555. 
Kuttner, R., 2012. Property Markets and Financial Stability, Journal of Economic Issues, 
58(7), pp.32-49.   
Liang, J., Mao, W., and Yeh, C., 2012. A model of the interactions between asset prices 
bubble bursts and twin crises, Journal of Information and Optimization Sciences, 
33(2-3), pp.273-294. 
Makin, A. J., (2013). The policy (in)effectiveness of government spending in a dependent 
economy, Journal of Economic Policy Reform, 16(3), pp.287-301. 
Mishkin, F.S., 2009. Globalization, macroeconomic performance, and monetary policy. 
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 41(1), 187-196. 
Mishkin, F.S., 2011. Monetary policy strategy: lessons from the crisis, NBER Working Paper 
No. 16755 
Obstfeld, M., 2015. Trilemmas and Trade-Offs: Living with Financial Globalization, BIS 
Working Paper Series No. 480.  
Ostry, J. D., Ghosh, A. R., Kim, J. I., and Qureshi, M. S., 2010. Fiscal Space. International 
Monetary Fund, Research Department. 
Pasquariello, P., 2014. Financial Market Dislocations, Review of Financial Studies, 27(1), 
pp.1868-1914.  
Perez, S. and Westrup, J., 2008. Finance and the Macro-economy: The Politics of Regulatory 
Reform in Europe. Center for European Studies Working Paper Series No. 156. 
Pierre, J., 2015. Varieties of capitalism and varieties of globalization: comparing patterns of 
market deregulation, Journal of European Public Policy, 22(7), pp.908-926. 
Posen, A. S., 2011. Monetary policy, Bubbles, and the Knowledge Problem, Cato Journal, 
31(3), pp.461-471.  
Prasad, E. S., Rogoff, K., Wei, S-J., and Kose, M. A., 2003. Effects of Financial 
Globalization on Developing Countries: Some Empirical Evidence, IMF Working 
Paper Series No. 031703.  
Ramey, V. A. and Zubairy S., 2014. Government Spending Multipliers in Good Times and in 
Bad: Evidence from U.S. Historical Data, NBER Working Paper No. 20719.   
46 
 
Rausser, G. C.,  Swinnen, J., and Zusman, P., 2011. Political Power and Economic Policy: 
Theory, analysis and Empirical Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Rausser, G. C.,  Swinnen, J., and Zusman, P., 2011. Political Power and Economic Policy: 
Theory, analysis and Empirical Applications. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Rey, H., 2015. Dilemma not Trilemma: The global Financial Cycle and Monetary Policy 
Independence, NBER Working Paper No. 21162. 
Rodrik, D., 2012. Globalization Dilemmas & the Way Out, The Indian Journal of Industrial 
Relations, 47(3), pp.393-404. 
Samuels, D. J., and Shugart, M. S., 2011. Presidents, Parties, and Prime Ministers: How the 
Separation of Powers Affects Party Organization and Behavior. USA: Cambridge 
University Press  
Schwaab, B., Koopman, S. J., and Lucas, A., 2013. Nowcasting and forecasting global 
financial sector stress and credit market dislocation, International Journal of 
Forecasting, 2014(30), pp.741-758. 
Soare, L., 2013. Creating a linkage between academic research and policy-making, 
Europolity, 7(2), pp.89-102.  
Song, E., 2010. Reform of RMB Exchange Rate Regime and the Banking System in China: 
The Problem with Asset Bubbles, The ISM Journal of International Business, 1(2), 
pp.2-14. 
Stella, P., 2009. The Federal Reserve Balance Sheet: What Happened and Why it Matters, 
IMF Working Paper Series No. 09120. 
Stoian, A., 2014. Public Messages and Asset Prices, Atlantic Economic Journal, 2014(42), 
pp.441-454.  
Sun, X., and Yan, L., 2012. Mixed-fractional Models to Credit Risk Pricing. Journal of 
Statistical and Econometric Methods, 1(3), pp.79-96. 
Sundquist, J. L., 2011. Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of 
Political Parties in the United States. Revised ed. Washington: Brookings Institution 
Press.  
Tanzi, V., 2015. Fiscal and Monetary Policies during the great Recession: A Critical 
Evaluation, Comparative Economic Studies, 57(2), pp.243-275. 
Taylor, J., B., 2009. Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused, 
Prolonged, and Worsened the Financial Crisis. Hoover Institution Press, Stanford CA. 
Taylor, J., B., 2013. International monetary policy coordination: past, present and future, BIS 
Working Paper Series No. 437. 
Taylor, J.B. and Williams, J.C., 2009. A black swan in the money market. American 
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 1(1), pp.58-83. 
47 
 
Thompson, G., 2014. The Conservatives’ Economic Policy. New York: Routledge. 
Thurston, A. and Bowen, K., 2011. U.S. Domestic Politics and International Political 
Economy: An Introduction to the Special Issue, Business and Politics, 13(3), pp.1-6. 
Veld, J., Larch, M., and Vandeweyer, M., 2012. Automatic Fiscal Stabilisers: What they are 
and what they do, Vives Discussion Paper 29.  
Vo, X.V. and Daly, K.J., 2007. The determinants of international financial integration. Global 
Finance Journal, 18(2), pp.228-250. 
 
Woodford, M., 2011. Simple analytics of the government expenditure multiplier. American 
Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, 3(1),1-35. 
 
Woodford, M., 2012. Inflation Targeting and Financial Stability. NBER Working Paper 
Series No. 17967. National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Yao, J., Ma, C., and He, W. P., 2014. Investor herding behavior of Chinese stock market, 
International Review of Economics and Finance, 29(2014), pp.12-29.  
Yurichuk, S., 2010. Bubbles and Monetary Policy: Can China Avert a Minsky Moment?, The 
ISM Journal of International Business, 1(2), pp.79-85. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
48 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Macroeconomic Variables 
Country 
Government Spending Liquidity Provisions Interest Rates 
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Australia 0.014 0.016 0.019 0.012 -0.008 0.062 
Austria 0.004 0.009 0.010 0.019 -0.006 0.046 
Brazil 0.005 0.029 0.016 0.012 -0.008 0.049 
Canada 0.004 0.006 -0.024 0.224 -0.010 0.053 
China 0.041 0.493 0.038 0.042 -0.005 0.037 
France 0.003 0.006 0.013 0.022 -0.038 0.128 
Germany 0.003 0.009 0.012 0.014 -0.038 0.128 
Hong Kong 0.007 0.084 0.022 0.021 -0.002 0.036 
Japan 0.005 0.025 0.007 0.005 -0.012 0.083 
Malaysia 0.018 0.328 0.029 0.024 -0.006 0.025 
Netherlands -0.112 1.186 0.016 0.025 -0.035 0.200 
Norway 0.015 0.020 0.016 0.012 0.001 0.333 
Poland -0.015 0.606 0.022 0.023 -0.022 0.063 
Singapore 0.016 0.096 0.018 0.018 0.000 0.022 
South Africa 0.007 0.009 0.030 0.020 -0.006 0.054 
South Korea 0.010 0.010 0.026 0.017 -0.015 0.093 
Sweden 0.368 2.135 0.015 0.020 -0.026 0.172 
Switzerland 0.003 0.011 0.014 0.031 0.002 0.134 
Taiwan 0.095 0.267 0.096 0.233 -0.023 0.179 
United Kingdom 0.005 0.010 0.015 0.016 -0.019 0.121 
United States 0.003 0.008 0.012 0.016 -0.018 0.170 
Note: presents the mean (Mean), standard deviation (SD) for changes in government spending, liquidity 
provisions and interest rates for each of the selected countries. 
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Table 2: The Short-term Impact of Government Spending on Changes in Credit 
Spreads 
Country Lag Coefficient Standard Error T-Statistic 
Canada Second -34.04 10.339 -3.293** 
Norway First -10.05 4.317 -2.328* 
Poland First 0.33 0.139 2.379* 
 
Note: This table reports the results of the regression equation (1) where the dependent variable is the change in 
Credit Spreads and the independent variable is Government Spending. * denotes significance at the 5% level 
whilst ** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 3: The Impact of Government Spending on Market Interest Rates, GDP, 
Consumption and Investment 
Variables Country 
R-
Squared 
Adj. R-
Squared 
Constant Coefficient 
Interest rates Malaysia 0.154 0.143 
-0.010* -0.040** 
(-2.37) (-3.72) 
GDP 
Malaysia 0.405 0.398 
0.020** 0.083** 
(5.76) (7.74) 
China 0.876 0.874 
0.023** 0.248** 
(4.77) (24.90) 
South Africa 0.059 0.048 
0.006** 0.156* 
(8.68) (2.34) 
France 0.109 0.099 
0.005** -0.292** 
(8.29) (-3.28) 
Consumption 
United 
Kingdom 
0.084 0.073 
0.013** -0.197** 
(16.35) (-2.84) 
Australia 0.059 0.049 
0.007** 0.084* 
(9.48) (2.36) 
Hong Kong 0.089 0.078 
0.01 -0.169** 
(1.97) (-2.93) 
France 0.071 0.06 
0.005** -0.268* 
(7.40) (-2.59) 
Austria 0.046 0.035 
0.014 -4.199* 
(0.69) (-2.05) 
Investment 
United States 0.05 0.04 
0.013** -0.591* 
(5.77) (-2.17) 
Malaysia 0.079 0.068 
0.014 0.078** 
(1.47) (2.74) 
South Korea 0.059 0.048 
0.010* 0.663* 
(12.38) (-2.35) 
China 0.831 0.829 
0.029** 0.217** 
(5.59) (20.83) 
Brazil 0.712 0.709 
0.002 0.779** 
(0.14) (14.75) 
France 0.158 0.148 
0.006** -0.810** 
(4.60) (-4.06) 
Note: This table presents the results of the regression equation (1) where the dependent variables are Market 
Interest Rates (MIR), GDP, Consumption (C) and Investments (I), respectively whilst the independent variable 
is Government Spending. * denotes significance at the 5% level whilst ** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
T-Statistic is within parentheses.  
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Table 4: Underlying Impact of Liquidity Provision on Changes in Credit Spreads 
Type of Regression Country R-Squared Adj. R-Squared Coefficient 
Uncontrolled Canada 0.157 0.137 
-0.322*  
(0.13) 
Controlled 
Switzerland 0.161 0.098 
-1.289**  
(-2.79) 
Poland 0.186 0.095 
6.405* 
(2.17) 
 
Note: This table reports the results of the regression equation (2) where the dependent variable is the change 
in Credit Spreads and the independent variable is Liquidity Provisions. * denotes significance at the 5% level 
whilst ** denotes significance at the 1% level. T-Statistic is within parentheses. 
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Table 5: The Underlying Impact of Changes in Central Bank Interest Rates on Changes 
in Credit Spreads 
Type of Regression Country R-Squared 
Adj. R-
Squared 
Coefficient 
Uncontrolled 
Australia 0.166 0.147 
1.872**  
(4.064) 
United States 0.308 0.292 
-1.074**  
(-6.035) 
Singapore 0.059 0.037 
3.285* 
(2.263) 
Hong Kong 0.177 0.158 
4.262** 
(3.897) 
Canada 0.157 0.137 
0.566* 
(2.147) 
South Korea 0.071 0.050 
0.635* 
(2.545) 
South Africa 0.083 0.062 
3.997* 
(2.246) 
Taiwan 0.068 0.047 
-1.286* 
(-2.529) 
Germany 0.093 0.072 
0.549* 
(2.485) 
Controlled 
Australia 0.200 0.142 
2.277**  
(3.933) 
United States 0.416 0.374 
-0.826**  
(-4.060) 
Hong Kong 0.212 0.120 
4.423**  
(3.057) 
China 0.313 0.219 
2.316**  
(3.268) 
South Africa 0.445 0.404 
7.731**  
(5.117) 
 
Taiwan 0.166 0.099 
1.461**  
(-2.750) 
Germany 0.125 0.062 
0.584*  
(2.487) 
 
Note: This table presents the results of the regression equation (2) where the dependent variable is the change in 
Credit Spreads and the independent variable is central bank interest rates. * denotes significance at the 5% level 
whilst ** denotes significance at the 1% level. T-Statistic is within parentheses. 
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Table 6: Mean Comparison of Macroeconomic Policies based on Left-Wing and Right-
Wing Governments 
 
Political 
Orientation 
Policy 
Sum of 
Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean Square F Ratio 
Significance 
Level 
Left 
Government 
Spending 
0.187 20 0.009 0.460 0.980 
Liquidity 
Provision 
0.279 20 0.014 0.653 0.874 
Right 
Government 
Spending 
1.207 20 0.060 1.296 0.170 
Centre 
Government 
Spending 
0.063 2 0.032 0.193 0.825 
Liquidity 
Provision 
0.023 2 0.011 2.019 0.135 
 
Notes: The table details the analysis of variance results of macroeconomic policies implemented by 
governments based on their political orientation. F-ration denotes significance of the F-ratio. 
 
 
 
Table 7: The Underlying Influence of Left-Wing and Right-Wing Governments on the 
Policymaking Process 
Country Policy R-Squared Constant Coefficient Correlation 
United Kingdom Liquidity Provision 0.204 
0.007** 
(2.905) 
0.015** 
(4.743) 
0.451** 
Australia Liquidity Provision 0.065 
0.017** 
(10.416) 
0.006* 
(2.475) 
0.255* 
United States Government Spending 0.095 
0.006** 
(4.367) 
-0.005** 
(-3.035) 
-0.308** 
Brazil 
Government Spending 0.051 
0.145** 
(4.052) 
-0.122* 
(-2.176) 
-0.226* 
Liquidity Provision 0.052 
0.142** 
(4.499) 
-0.107* 
(-2.186) 
-0.227* 
Taiwan Liquidity Provision 0.105 
0.019** 
(12.563) 
-0.008** 
(-3.210) 
-0.324** 
France Interest Rates 0.097 
-0.026 
(-1.198) 
-0.147** 
(-3.083) 
-0.312** 
Poland Liquidity Provision 0.004 
0.025** 
(4.747) 
0.003 
(0.568) 
0.303** 
 
Note: This table presents the results of the correlation analysis and regression equation (3) where the dependent 
variable is Government Spending (GS), Liquidity Provision (LP) and Central Bank Interest Rates (CBIR) during 
Financial Market Disequilibria and the independent variable is the political orientation of governments. * 
denotes significance at the 5% level whilst ** denotes significance at the 1% level. T-Statistic is within 
parentheses. 
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Table 8: Policy Convergence across Political Orientations 
Policy Sum of Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean Square F Ratio 
Significance 
Level 
Government 
Spending 
0.093 2 0.046 1.098 0.334 
Liquidity 
Provision 
0.076 1 0.076 3.535 0.06 
Interest Rates 541.147 1610 0.336 0.844 1 
 
Notes: The table details the analysis of variance results to evaluate the notion of policy convergence. F-ration 
denotes significance of the F-ratio. 
 
 
 
Table 9: The Influence of Global Financial Integration on Liquidity Provision 
 
Country R-Squared Constant Coefficient 
United Kingdom 0.068 
0.012** 
(5.480) 
0.009* 
(2.539) 
United States 0.064 
0.014** 
(7.594) 
-0.011* 
(-2.459) 
South Korea 0.209 
0.034** 
(12.495) 
-0.016** 
(-4.825) 
Taiwan 0.054 
0.007 
(1.723) 
0.010* 
(2.250) 
 
Note: This table presents the results of the regression equation (4) where the dependent variable is Changes 
in Liquidity Provision (LP) during Financial Market Disequilibria and the independent variable is Global 
Financial Integration (GFI). * denotes significance at the 5% level whilst ** denotes significance at the 1% 
level. T-Statistic is within parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table 10: Policy Harmonisation 
Policy Sum of Squares 
Degrees of 
Freedom 
Mean Square F Ratio 
Significance 
Level 
Government 
Spending 4.853 20 0.243 3.918 0.000 
Liquidity 
Provision 
0.781 20 0.039 7.976 0.000 
Interest 
Rates 
8.249 20 0.412 13.603 0.000 
 
Notes: The table details the analysis of variance results to evaluate the notion of policy harmonisation. F-
ration denotes significance of the F-ratio. 
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Appendix 1: Changes in Credit Spreads 
 
Country Min Max Mean SD Skew Kurt 
Australia -1.815 3.157 0.070 0.748 1.06 4.57 
Austria -3.051 1.910 -0.040 0.579 -2.01 11.16 
Brazil -1.299 0.874 0.010 0.248 -1.02 11.22 
Canada -2.197 2.442 0.040 0.665 0.15 2.95 
China -0.397 0.272 -0.010 0.084 -0.95 6.58 
France -1.792 3.296 0.013 0.579 1.88 13.13 
Germany -2.996 1.897 -0.029 0.626 -1.44 7.80 
Hong Kong -0.934 1.580 0.020 0.398 0.69 3.63 
Japan -1.271 0.747 -0.022 0.316 -0.52 2.24 
Malaysia -0.773 0.554 -0.011 0.221 -0.89 2.12 
Netherlands -1.305 1.000 0.003 0.294 -0.85 5.94 
Norway -3.060 3.178 -0.008 0.712 0.56 10.50 
Poland -2.005 3.989 0.052 0.799 1.59 7.52 
Singapore -0.552 0.610 0.011 0.205 -0.23 1.30 
South Africa -0.282 0.219 -0.005 0.093 -0.76 1.12 
South Korea -1.906 1.705 -0.014 0.522 -0.33 3.36 
Sweden -0.652 0.655 -0.006 0.170 0.19 4.40 
Switzerland -1.758 2.416 -0.003 0.441 1.31 12.96 
Taiwan -3.258 3.664 0.035 1.089 0.16 3.70 
United Kingdom -1.409 2.125 0.021 0.424 0.83 7.68 
United States -1.682 1.681 -0.051 0.458 -0.69 4.59 
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics of changes in credit spreads for each of the 21 sample 
countries. The table provides the minimum (Min), maximum (Max), mean (Mean), standard deviation (SD), 
skewness. This table demonstrates that the changes in the credit spreads of the 21 selected countries are both 
positive and negative for each country, with the average change in credit spreads being positive for 10 of the 
selected countries. Regarding skewness, the changes in credit spreads of 10 of the selected countries are skew to 
the right whilst for kurtosis, 15 of the selected countries have kurtosis values higher than three.   
 
